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Baughman: Baughman: Missouri's Stance on Household Exclusion

Missouri's Stance on Household Exclusion
Clauses in Automobile Insurance Contracts:
Consistent with Public Policy?
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward'
I. INTRODUCTON
Should an insurer be able to deny coverage to a family member involved
in an automobile accident simply because the individual lives in the same
household as a negligent driver? In American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Ward, the Missouri Supreme Court overruled a lower court decision that
would have allowed an injured household member to recover if the driver is
insured by an uncertified, pre-1987 insurance policy containing a household
exclusion clause.2 The supreme court held that it is not a violation of
Missouri public policy to deny coverage in these circumstances. This Note
examines various policy considerations affected by the use of household
exclusion clauses in automobile liability insurance policies and demonstrate
how Missouri's public policy is affected by the Ward decision.
II. FAcrs AND HOLDING
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (American Family) brought a
declaratory judgment action seeking relief of financial responsibility to defend

or to indemnify defendant, Larry Ward, on claims concerning Larry Ward's
automobile liability insurance policy.3 The six-month policy was issued by
American Family on December 1, 1984, and contained a household exclusion
clause. 4 The dispute arose out of a multi-vehicle collision occurring on
March 16, 1985, in which Larry Ward was driving.5 The insured's wife,
Karen Ward, was a passenger and sustained bodily injuries.6

1. 789 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1990) (en banc).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 792.
4. Id. Larry Ward's insurance policy stated as follows: "EXCLUSIONS. This
coverage does not apply to ... [b]odily injury to any person injured while operating
your insured car or for bodily injury to any person related to and residing in the same
household with the operator." Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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The Wards filed suit against two other drivers in the accident.7 The two
drivers counterclaimed against Larry Ward, seeking contribution for any of
Karen Ward's damages that were attributable to Larry Ward's negligence.'
The Wards also filed suit against American Family pursuant to the uninsured
motorist provision of the Ward's insurance policy to collect for Karen's
damages caused by an unidentified hit and run driver involved in the
accident.' A jury found that Larry Ward was twenty percent at fault and
0
determined that Karen Ward, had incurred $1,500,000 in damages."
American Family alleged that the household exclusion clause in Larry
Ward's policy relieved it of any obligation to answer a claim of contribution
for Karen Ward's damages caused by Larry Ward or any obligation to pay her
The Wards
damages under the policy's uninsured motorist provision."
asserted that the clause was invalid because it conflicted with Missouri public
policy. They claimed that Missouri's adoption of contribution and apportionment among tortfeasors 12 and the abrogation of interspousal immunity for
negligent torts 3 both warranted invalidating the clause. The Wards further
argued that the clause was contrary to public policy reflected in the Missouri
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law (MSRL). 4 American Family
argued that pursuant to the Ward's contract of insurance, 15 the MSRL public
policy did not become effective until the Ward's insurance policy was
certified by American Family as proof of future financial responsibility under
16
the MSRL.
The circuit court entered judgment for American Family and held that the
clear and unambiguous language in the exclusionary clause relieved the

7. ML
8. Id. See Ward v. American Family Ins. Co., 783 S.W.2d 921 (Mo. Ct. App.

1989).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id
12. See Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo.
1978) (en banc).
13. See S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
14. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 303.010-.270 (1989).
15. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 792. The Wards' insurance policy provided as follows:
When we [American Family] certify this policy as proof under any financial
responsibility law, it will comply with the law to the extent of the required

coverage. You [Larry Ward] agree to repay us for any payment we would
not have had to make except for this agreement .... Terms of this policy
which are in conflict with the statutes of the state in which this policy is
issued are changed to conform to those statutes.
Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 793. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10
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insurer of any liability for Karen Ward's injuries. 7 The court based its
holding on the non-retroactive effect of the abrogation of interspousal
immunity and the adoption of mandatory insurance laws, each adopted in
Missouri after the accident occurred.18
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District reversed the
circuit court decision and transferred the case to the Missouri Supreme
Court.19 In reversing, the court of appeals acknowledged that parties were
free to contract but determined that the public policies "as expressed in the
Safety Responsibility Law, by the adoption of contribution,
and by the
2
abrogation of interspousal immunity" outweigh this freedom. 0
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that a household
exclusion clause in an uncertified motor vehicle liability insurance policy does
not contravene the public policies underlying the contribution and apportionment doctrines, the abrogation of interspousal immunity, and the MSRL as it
existed in 1985.21
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. NationalApproach to Household Exclusion Clauses
Household exclusion clauses evolved as a result of the abrogation of
intrafamily immunity.? Such clauses typically state that insurance coverage
is not available for "bodily injury to any person related to and residing in the
same household with the operator."' The purpose of the clause is to limit
the contractual liability of insurance companies and to protect insurers from
fraudulent and collusive claims. Jurisdictions have rendered inconsistent

17. Id. at 791.
18. Id.
19. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, No. 55512 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 22,
1989).
20. 1d at 13.
21. Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 796.
22. See Note, The HouseholdExclusion Clause-Returningto the Days ofFamily
Immunity, 7 HAMUNE L. REv. 507, 507 (1983).
23. See supra note 4.
24. See Note, supra note 22, at 510-13.
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decisions concerning household exclusion clause validity,2 but a majority
have found them invalid.2
Most jurisdictions that have found these clauses invalid have done so
primarily for public policy reasons.27 For example, in Geico v. Dickey,28
the Georgia Supreme Court determined that promoting a household exclusion
clause would be in direct "conflict with the policy underlying [the state's]
Noting that the policy of the state was to
compulsory insurance law."'
automobile liability coverage, the
public
through
comprehensive
protect the
court specifically held that "if the exclusion were broader than the tort
immunity of the state, the exclusion would be against public policy."30
In Bishop v. Allstate Insurance Co.,31 the Kentucky Supreme Court
considered the validity of a household exclusion clause in light of the state's

mandatory insurance statute, the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparation Act

(MVRA). The court held the exclusion invalid because it violated the purpose
of mandatory insurance by acting to eliminate insurance coverage for a motor
vehicle operator 2 Because the legislature modeled the MVRA after the
Uniform Motor Vehicles Accident Reparations Act and specifically omitted
sections allowing certain exclusions, the court reasoned that the legislature did
not intend "that the minimum tort liability coverage be diluted or eliminated
'
by exclusions."33

25. See Annotation, Validity, Under Insurance Statutes, of CoverageExclusion
for Injury to or Death of Insured'sFamily or HouseholdMembers, 52 A.L.R.4th 18
(1987) (a comprehensive discussion of the validity of various household exclusion
clauses analyzed in state and federal cases). See also 6C S. LimBo, APPLEMAN'S
INsURANcE LAW AN PRACrcE § 4411 (Supp. 1989).
26. Clapp, The Household Exclusion in Automobile Insurance Policies, INS.
CouNs. J., April 1986, at 248. See also Meyer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 689
P.2d 585, 590 (Colo. 1984) (finding a household exclusion clause invalid is consistent
with the majority of jurisdictions). The majority rule that household exclusion clauses
are invalid is a recent trend. Other prior decisions are inconsistent with this statement
because the prior majority rule was that the clauses were valid. See State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Mo. 1960) ("We approve the majority
rule."); Gabler v. Continental Casualty Co., 295 S.W.2d 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956);
Perkins v. Perkins, 284 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955).
27. Note, Family Exclusion Clauses Void in Automobile InsurancePolicies, 35
DRAKE L. REv. 817, 825 (1986-87).
28. 340 S.E.2d 595 (Ga. 1986).
29. Id. at 596.
30. hl. at 596-97.
31. 623 S.W.2d 865 (Ky. 1981).
32. Id. at 867.
33. Id. at 866.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10
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Similarly, in Mutual of Enumclaw Insurance Co. v. Wiscomb,34 the
Washington Supreme Court used the rationale behind the state's Financial
Responsibility Act to determine that a household exclusion clause was void
in contravention of the state's public policy.3 5 Although the Washington
statute did not require proof of motor vehicle liability insurance until after an
accident occurred, the policy behind the Act was to assure "monetary
protection and compensation to those persons who suffer injuries through the
negligent use of public highways by others."'
Thus, the court held that
household exclusion clauses are void because they deprive innocent victims
of the benefit of protection and compensation simply because they live with
the negligent driver.37
Another policy justification for denying the validity of household
exclusion clauses is the policy underlying the abrogation of intrafamily
immunity.' In TransamericaInsurance Co. v. Royle,39 a daughter brought

an action against her parents' insurance company to recover for injuries
sustained in an accident in which her parents were driving. 40 The daughter
sought recovery against her parents, and later challenged the validity of the
exclusion clause in her parents' insurance policy.41 The court stated, "[I]f we
recognize parental immunity, then the exclusion clause is valid.., if parentchild immunity does not exist, then the exclusion clause must be invalid
....
,,42 Thus, once the court determined that intrafamily immunity could no
longer exist in Montana, the clause logically was held invalid.43
The minority find household exclusion clauses valid and base their
justification primarily on freedom to contract, avoidance of collusion, and

34. 97 Wash. 2d 203, 643 P.2d 441 (1982).
35. d. at 209, 643 P.2d at 444.
36. Id. at 206, 643 P.2d at 442.
37. Id. at 208, 643 P.2d at 444.
38. See Note, supra note 27, at 824-25. See-also Farmer's Ins. Group v. Reed,
109 Idaho 849, 712 P.2d 550 (1986). In Reed, parents brought an action against their
son, the negligent driver, to recover for expenses incurred in an automobile accident.
Id. at 850, 712 P.2d at 551. The Idaho Supreme Court held the household exclusion
clause invalid, stating that "every state which has considered intrafamily immunity in
the context of negligently caused automobile accidents and household exclusion clauses
has... invalidated the exclusion clause in the insurance contract." Id. at 850, 712
P.2d at 551.
39. 202 Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983).
40. Id at 174, 656 P.2d at 821.
41. Id. at 174, 656 P.2d at 822.
42. Id. at 175, 656 P.2d at 822.
43. Idl at 180, 656 P.2d at 824.
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absence of specific language in state statutes voiding the clauses." For
example, in Walker v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,45 an insured
passenger was injured fatally in an automobile accident. His personal
representative brought a wrongful death action against the driver who had
been given consent to drive the vehicle by the insured.46 The court refused
recovery on the wrongful death action because the insured's policy contained
a household exclusion clause that also included language that specifically
excluded coverage for an injured insured. 47 In upholding the validity of the
exclusion clause, the court stated that insurance companies are free to limit the
scope of coverage to protect themselves from collusive actions and
that
4
court.
this
by
lightly
taken
not
is
contract
to
individuals
of
"freedom
B. Applicable MissouriLaw
Missouri traditionally has followed the minority view that household49
exclusion clauses are valid and not in contravention of public policy.
Recently, however, the state has made significant judicial and legislative
changes that could affect this view.
In MissouriPacificRailroad Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co.,50 a railroad
company was sued by a consignee when the consignee's employee fell from
a three-decker automobile rack railcar and was injured.5' The railroad
company wanted to join the manufacturer and installer of the rack as third-

44. See Clapp, supra note 26, at 249. See also Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking,
29 Cal. 3d 383, 286 P.2d 1, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1981); United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Hanley, 172 Ind. App. 329, 360 N.E.2d 247 (1977).
45. 340 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1983).
46. Id. at 600.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 602 (quoting Skyline Harvestore Systems, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co.,
331 N.W.2d 106, 109 (Iowa 1983)).
49. See Harrison v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 607 S.W.2d 137, 139 (Mo. 1980) (en
banc) (insurance policy that excluded family members from uninsured motorist liability
insurance policy is not void); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 340 S.W.2d 635
(Mo. 1960) (Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law stating that a "certified" policy
will conform to liability imposed by law did not change household exclusion clause
in automobile liability insurance policy); Hussman v. Government Employees Ins. Co.,
768 S.W.2d 585,587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (household exclusion clause remains valid
although Missouri has abrogated intrafamily immunity); Foster v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 750 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (wife could not recover from
insurer for injuries because husband and wife were living together in a common
household).
50. 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en banc).
51. Id. at 467.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10
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party defendants for indemnification.52
The Missouri Supreme Court
overruled the prior rule that there was no right to contribution between
concurrent joint torifeasors, unless provided by statute 3 Thus, the court
held that two tortfeasors should be "treated according to their respective
fault
55
or responsibility"54 in order to comply with the doctrine of fainess.
The Missouri Supreme Court, in the companion cases Townsend v.
Townsend5 and S.A.V. v. KG.V., 57 determined that spousal immunity was
no longer a bar to intentional and negligent tort actions. In Townsend, a wife
brought an action against her husband seeking damages for injuries she
suffered when he intentionally shot her in the back.58 The court noted that
interspousal immunity had been traditionally based on the common law view
that a husband and wife became one upon marriage, and hence, no legal
action would be feasible between the two. 59 Once Missouri adopted the
Rights of Married Women Act, 60 however, a woman's legal existence
became equal to and separate from that of her husband's, and the common law
doctrine of unity no longer had a basis. 6' Thus, the court determined that the
wife could maintain an action against her spouse for an intentional tort.62
Similarly, the SA.V. court determined that a wife could maintain an action

52. Id.
53. Id,at 469, 472.
54. Id. at 472.
55. Id. at 474. The court stated that indemnity was connected to fairness.
Historically, Missouri has used an "active-passive" test in which the passive tortfeasor

was not found liable but the active tortfeasor was. Id. at 470. The test often gave
illogical results that were not based on fairness principles. The present decision does
away with the historical test and contemplates any kind of negligence resulting in fault.
Id. at 470-72.
56. 708 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
57. 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
58. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d at 646.
59. Id. at 647. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage,
or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." Id. (quoting 1
W. BIACKSTONE COMMENTARIEs 442). This view made such suits impractical
because the husband was viewed as suing himself. Id.
60. This statute, adopted in 1889, has not changed and is currently codified as
Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 451.250-.300 (1986). The Married Women's Act described a
woman as being "femme sole" for business and contract purposes and allowed women
to sue and contract with others without her husband being involved. Townsend, 708
S.W.2d at 647-48; see Mo. REv. STAT. § 451.290 (1986).
61. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d at 649-50.
62. Id. at 650.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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against her spouse after he negligently exposed her to a venereal disease. 63
Relying on the trend throughout the nation to abrogate spousal immunity as
to all tort claims, the court determined that spousal immunity was no longer
a bar to negligence actions."
The Missouri Legislature enacted the MSRL to "protect the public
from injury or damage by the operation of motor vehicles upon the public
highways."6' The provisions of the MSRL are to be given a liberal interpretation to best facilitate public policy. 67 Pursuant to this statute as it existed in
1985, when an individual was involved in an accident, the owner or operator
of a motor vehicle had to furnish proof of financial responsibility to be
relieved of the possibility of losing his driver's license or registration.(' To
satisfy proof of financial responsibility, an owner or operator must have had
a liability policy properly "certified" in writing by the insurer to the Director
of Revenue that he had automobile liability coverage of not less than $25,000
for one person injured, or $50,000 for two persons injured.( Thus, until an

63. S.A.V., 708 S.W.2d at 652. The appellant alleged that her husband "wilfully,
recklessly and negligently transmitted the disease to appellant without informing her
of his infection." Id. The trial court determined that interspousal immunity prevented
the wife's claim. Id.
64. Id, at 653.
65. Mo. REv.STAT. §§ 303.010-.370 (1986). The specific section dealing with
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility states that an owner's policy of liability insurance
[s]hall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured,
using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied
permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed
by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of
such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States of America
or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits, exclusive of interest and
costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, as follows: twenty-five
thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any
one accident and, subject to said limit for one person, fifty thousand dollars
because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one
accident, and ten thousand dollars because of injury to or destruction of
property of others in any one accident.
Id. '§303.190(2).
66. City of St. Louis v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo. 1961).
67. Id. at 788.
68. Protective Casualty Ins. Co. v. Cook, 734 S.W.2d 898,906-07 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987). Once a license or registration has been suspended, proof of financial
responsibility must be demonstrated. The proof is not mandatory, but no license or
registration will be returned until the proof is furnished to the Director of Revenue.
Id.
69. Id. at 907.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10
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accident occurred, no "certification" of proof of financial responsibility was
required.
Effective July 1, 1987, Missouri became a compulsory insurance state.7'
The result of this change was that the law "require[d] an owner or operator to
carry liability insurance in order for the vehicle to be operated on public
The provisions of the MSRL (renamed Missouri "Financial"
highways."'
Responsibility Law) and the protective coverage for victims of negligent
motorists immediately come into play, and there is no longer an opportunity
for a motorist to have one "free" accident?3 Thus, this change indicates the
importance that the legislature placed on having continuous protective
coverage for victims of motor vehicle accidents.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward, the Wards argued
that Missouri's adoption of contribution and apportionment indicates a public
policy that conflicts with upholding the validity of household exclusion
clauses. 74 The Wards asserted that Missouri's adoption of contribution and
apportionment among tortfeasors and the abrogation of spousal immunity have
created a new class of persons, negligent spouses, for whom no liability
coverage presently exists.7'
Relying on Whitehead & Kales, the Wards
concluded that household exclusion clauses weaken the tort liability distribu-

tion created by contribution.76 This argument is illustrated by the facts in the
Ward case. Karen Ward, the injured spouse, received a judgment against the
negligent driver involved in the collision. The negligent driver received a
judgment for contribution against Larry Ward proportionate to Ward's
contributory negligence. Because Larry Ward's insurance policy contained a
household exclusion clause, Karen Ward was unable to recover the entire
amount of her damages, the negligent driver was unable to obtain contribution,
77
and Larry Ward was unprotected from a personal judgment.
In response, American Family relied on MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Howard Construction Co.78 to argue that the.policy behind contribution was

70. Id. at 906-07. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.170 (1986).
71. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 303.010-.025 (1989).
72. Cook, 734 S.W.2d at 906.

73. See 12-A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE
1981).
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

LAW,

§ 45.721 (2d ed.

Ward, 789 S.W.2d at 792.
Id.
Id.
Id.
608 S.W.2d 535 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
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inapplicable because the third-party action filed by the other drivers against
Larry Ward was not valid. 79 In Howard, the insured was operating a motor
vehicle involved in an accident in which her two children were passengers."
A daughter brought suit against Howard Construction Co. (Howard), alleging
negligence for failure to post warning signs near the scene of the accident.8 1
Howard sought contribution for any negligence due to the decedent and filed
a third-party claim against the insured's estate. 82 MFA sought a declaratory
judgment that the household exclusion precluded any liability
it may have for
83
bodily injuries resulting from the insured's negligence.
Howard argued that the household exclusion was inapplicable because its
contribution claim was a claim against the mother's estate and not a claim
between family members. 4 Alternatively, Howard asserted that if the
exclusion applied, the clause was void as against the contribution public
policy expressly adopted in Whitehead & Kales.8s The Howard court
acknowledged that when the original plaintiff is barred by immunity, a third
party, having a derivative claim, similarly is barred.86 The immunity would
serve as an exception to contribution doctrine. 87 The court determined,
however, that Howard had a valid claim for contribution because the claim
was derivative from the daughter's cause of action, and parental immunity
ceased to exist upon the mother's death. 88
The court stated that it would be unsound to determine that the household
exclusion did not apply since the "third-party action in origin is the same as
could be maintained by the original plaintiff, [and] it is doubtful that any real
distinction can be made because the third-party petition is filed by one seeking
apportionment and contribution." 89 The Howard court determined that
"[i]nsurance policy exposure is neither enhanced nor reduced by [the
apportionment and contribution] aspect of Whitehead and Kales."' 9 Because
the household exclusion clause was plain and unambiguous, the court held that

79. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, No. 55512, slip op. at 7 (Mo. Ct.
App. Aug. 22, 1989).
80. Id.
81. Howard, 608 S.W.2d at 535.
82. Id. at 536-37.
83. Id. at 537.
84. 1d

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 538.
89. Id.
90. Id. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Whitehead & Kales.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10
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the intent of the parties controlled and that the household exclusion clause was
valid.91 The court refrained from addressing the public policy issue concerning household exclusion clauses.
The Wards used Townsend v. Townsend2 and SA.V. v. K.G.V.93 to
argue that the conflict between use of household exclusions and public policy
9
was enhanced further in light of the abrogation of interspousal immunity. 4
The supreme court relied upon "[1]ong established common law principles
[that] authorize courts to compel tort-feasors to compensate those they
intentionally or negligently injure."95 The Wards asserted that abrogation of
interspousal immunity lends further support for the policy of equitable
distribution of tort liability underlying contribution, and that the continued
validity of household exclusion clauses undermine this policy. 96
American Family relied upon Cameron Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Proctor97 and Hussman v. Government Employees Insurance Co.9' to argue
that the clause was unaffected by the abrogation of interspousal immunity. In
Cameron, a husband and wife were involved in a collision in which the
husband was driving. 99 The husband and wife were both named on an
insurance policy which contained an exclusion for the named insured'as well
as a household exclusion clause.'0° The wife brought a personal injury
action against her deceased husband's estate for personal injuries she sustained
in the collision.' 0 1 The insurance company sought a declaration that it was
not liable to defend any action or pay for damages incurred due to the wife's
injuries.'"
The Cameron court acknowledged the abrogation of interspousal .
immunity but upheld the exclusionary clause and stated that "[t]here exists no

91. Howard, 608 S.W.2d at 538.
92. See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Townsend.
93. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
decision.
94. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, No. 55512 (Mo. Ct. App. Aug. 22,
1989).
95. Id. at 9 (quoting Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo. 1986)
(en banc)).
96. Id.
97. 758 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
98. 768 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
99. Cameron Mut. Ins., 758 S.W.2d at 68.
100. Id. The clause stated that "[t]his policy does not apply ... to bodily injury
to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured." Id. at 69.
101. Id.
102. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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public policy consideration which would require respondent not to exclude a

named insured ... from coverage for her own bodily injuries."'"3 The
Cameron court did not address the issue of whether the policy underlying
abolition of interspousal immunity would require invalidation of household
exclusion clauses because the wife was excluded as a named insured and not
as a household member.'0 4
In Hussman, the insured was a driver involved in an automobile accident
in which his wife, a passenger, was injured. 0 5 The insurance policy in
question contained an exclusion that disallowed coverage for bodily injury to
"any insured."' °6 The policy defined "insured" as "you and your relatives.""°
The Missouri Court of Appeals, relying in part on Cameron,
determined that the household exclusion clause in the insured's policy was not
void after Missouri abrogated spousal immunity.1°8
The Wards used the MSRL °9 to assert that household exclusion
clauses contravene the statute's policy to provide "financial remuneration" for
individuals injured by tortfeasors involved in motor vehicle accidents.'1
The statute states that motor vehicle liability policies protect the insured
"against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicle."'' The Wards took
the position that the public policy underlying the MSRL should be mandatory
for all drivers, regardless of whether an insurance policy has been "certified"
by the insurer as proof of future financial responsibility."
The Wards
based their position on three Missouri decisions involving interpretation of
omnibus clauses in motor vehicle liability insurance policies."'
In the first case, Winterton v. Van Zandt,"4 the insurance policy
contained an omnibus clause providing coverage to any operator having the

103. Id. at 70.
104. Id.
105. Hussman, 768 S.W.2d at 586.
106. Id. at 587.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.010 (1986). This currently is titled the Motor
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law due to a 1987 amendment.
110. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo. 1990)
(en banc). See also City of St. Louis v. Carpenter, 341 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Mo. 1961).
111. American Family Mut. Ins. Co, 789 S.W.2d at 793 (citing Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 303.190.2(2) (1986)).
112. Id. at 794.
113. Id.
114. 351 S.W.2d 696 (Mo. 1961).
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insured's permission to operate the vehicle" 5 and language stating that the
policy was intended to comply with the MSRL." 6 The court used the
public policy and statutory language of the MSRL applying to a "certified"
policy to interpret the omnibus clause in the uncertified policy in question. 1 7 Thus, arguing by analogy, the Wards contended that the financial
remuneration purpose behind the MSRL in a certified policy should also apply
to an uncertified policy."1 '
In Weathers v. Royal Indemnity,"9 the court determined that where an
omnibus clause is ambiguous, the public policy of the MSRL encourages
liberal construction to comply with the protection purpose of motor vehicle
insurance policies.'2 In Weathers, an action to recover for personal injuries
suffered in an automobile accident was brought against an insurer of a rental
car.' 21 The insurance policy contained an omnibus clause that extended
coverage to any person using the rental car with "permission" of the
lessor.'2 When the lessee loaned the car to another, the court determined
that the language in the omnibus clause should be interpreted broadly to cover
the injured driver, even though the person actually granted "permission" had
not been driving." 3 Thus, the Wards concluded that language in their
insurance policy similarly should be interpreted broadly to cover Karen
4
Ward's injuries to comply with the underlying public policy in the MSRL."

1115. Id. at 698. In Winterton, the driver of a vehicle had been granted by the
insured permission to go to the store a few blocks away, but was involved in an
accident over sixty miles from the insured's home. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. The Winterton court noted:
The provisions of [Mo. REV. STAT. § 303.170 (1986)] are indicative of the
public policy of this state to assure financial remuneration to the extent and
under the conditions therein provided for damages sustained through the
negligent operation of motor vehicles upon the public highways of this state
not only by the owners of such automobiles but also all persons using them
with the owners' permission, express or implied.
Id. at 700-01.
118. American Family Mut. Ins. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Mo. 1990) (en
banc).
119. 577 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1979) (en banc).
120. Id. at 625. The clause provided insurance coverage for any driver so long
as the driver had been given permission to use the car by the insured rental car
company. Id. at 624.
121. Id. at 624-25.
122. Id. at 624.
123. Id. at 630.
124. See American Family Mut. Ins. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Mo. 1990)
(en banc).
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The third case, Allstate Insurance v. Sullivan," involved interpretation
of an omnibus clause in an automobile rental company agreement. The clause
covered the "named insured" and any driver given permission by the insured
to drive the vehicle. 126 The policy specifically excluded coverage for any
driver operating the vehicle "while under the influence of intoxicants or
narcotics."' 7 Sullivan was involved in a collision while driving the vehicle
in an intoxicated condition. 12 The court found that both the insured and the
insurer intended that the policy comply with the MSRL. 129 The court stated
that the insurer's argument that an insurance policy should receive a restrictive.
interpretation until it is "certified" should be given no merit, 30 and that
"[a]ny policy providing less protection [than that required in the Safety
3
Responsibility Law] is contrary to the public policy of this state."' '
American Family argued that the MSRL applied only to "certified"
insurance policies. 32 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v.
Ward,'33 an insurer brought a declaratory judgment action to determine
liability on a claim filed by a wife and daughter injured in an automobile
accident in which the insured decedent was driving.3 The insurance policy
sold to the decedent contained a household exclusion clause. 13 ' The
Missouri Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim that the household
exclusion clause contravened the public policy of Missouri's MSRL. The
court concluded that the applicable statutory sections relied on pertained only
to operator's policies that
have been certified by the insurer as proof of
136
financial responsibility.
The Missouri Supreme Court disagreed with the Wards' arguments and
held for American Family. The court noted that Sullivan had been criticized
for falling to cite State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Ward.137 The

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

643 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
Id. at 22.
Md.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 23.

132. American Family Mut. Ins. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo. 1990) (en
banc). (Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 303.170-.180 (1986) are the applicable statutes that
provide for certification of motor vehicle liability policies).
133. 340 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1961).
134. Id. at 637.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 638.
137. American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791,795 (Mo. 1990)
(en banc) (relying on the following decisions to support this proposition: Protective
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10
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court also noted that Sullivan has not been followed consistently in later
cases."3 The court distinguished Sullivan from the case at bar because the
Ward policy contained a household exclusion clause and not an omnibus
clause as the Sullivan policy did. Sullivan was also distinguishable because
that policy specifically undertook to meet the requirements of the MSRL, and
the Wards' insurance policy committed only to modify terms that were "in
conflict with the statutes." 39 The court concluded that the Sullivan holding
was limited and could not be considered "authoritative beyond the context in
which it was decided."' 4
The court further noted that Winterton, Weathers, and Sullivan concerned
rules of liberal contract construction when interpreting "ambiguous" language
in insurance policies.' 4 ' The court held that when language is clear and
unambiguous, as was the language in the Ward insurance policy, the rules for
contract construction are inapplicable. 4 2
The court found that the public policy applying to the Wards' insurance
policy was embodied in the MSRL as it existed in 1985 when the accident
occurred, and not the public policy underlying the statute as it existed in
1990.14' The court noted that the public policy under the 1985 statute was
that "ambiguous provisions.., will be liberally construed to conform to the
liability coverage described in [the MSRL]," and that automobile insurance
was strictly a voluntary undertaking.'" The court found that because
insurance was voluntary, parties were free to agree to any terms, "subject only
to the requirements that the contract is lawful and reasonable."1 45
Concluding there was no evidence that the family exclusion clause in the
Wards' insurance policy was unreasonable under general contract principles,
or "certified" as proof of financial responsibility, the court held that the
insurance policy was not contrary to the public policy embodied in the 1985
MSRL.' 4 Similarly, the court held that "[n]either adoption of contribution
and apportionment among joint tort-feasors nor the abrogation of interspousal
immunity modify public policy as expressed in the 1985 version of the Safety

Casualty Ins. v. Cook, 734 S.W.2d 898, 908 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Universal
Underwriters Ins. v. Weber, 701 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citing Ward, 340 S.W.2d at 640).

146. Id. at 796.
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Responsibility Law, by mandating the
coverage required in an uncertified
"147
policy.
insurance
liability
automobile
In a concurring opinion, Judge Covington mentioned that although
Ward's arguments were persuasive considering Missouri's 1987 change to a
compulsory insurance state, the public policy that existed at the time the
accident occurred was the only public policy that was relevant. 148 She noted
that the Missouri Supreme Court's abrogation of interspousal immunity in
SA.V. applied to judgments that had not been entered as of the date the
opinion was issued, and that Cameron and Hussman did not undermine the
SA.V. holding.1 49
Judge Covington noted a discrepancy, however, in the interplay of the
Cameron and Hussman opinions.5 Because the wife in Cameron was
excluded as a named insured on the policy pursuant to language excluding the
"insured" and not due specifically to the household exclusion portion of the
clause, the court did not analyze the validity of household exclusion
clauses.' 51 In Hussman, however, it was not clear that the injured wife was
not a named insured.' 52 The importance of this distinction is that if the wife
in Hussman had been a named insured, Cameron lends adequate support for
the Hussman holding. 5 3 If not, then Cameron is not controlling. Because
Cameron did not address the validity of household exclusion clauses, if
respect to the
Cameron controls, then "the Hussman Court's language with
54
validity of family exclusion clauses is merely surplusage."
Judge Covington gave merit to the cumulative effect of policies
underlying the interaction of the MSRL, the adoption of contribution, and the
abrogation of interspousal immunity. However, she stated that these policy
considerations "may well signal that the public policy of this state now favors
indemnification of Larry Ward ... [but] whatever the public policy now
espoused by the State of Missouri, 'this Court should not by judicial
fiat
155
retroactively impose that policy on this antecedent insurance contract."

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Id.
Id.
1d at 797.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ward decided the status of
household exclusion clauses in motor vehicle liability insurance policies that6
pre-dated compulsory insurance legislation enacted in Missouri in 1987.s
The decision left uncertain, however, the status of motor vehicle insurance
policies written post-1987. If the Supreme Court had affirmed the Court of
Appeals' decision, there would have been consistency with existing public
policy and both the insurer and insured would be aware of their respective
rights under a contract of motor vehicle liability insurance. Under the present
limited decision, however, both groups may have to wait until Missouri courts
are confronted with a policy issued post-1987 which includes a household
exclusion clause.
Missouri traditionally has determined that household exclusion clauses are
valid.'57 The Missouri Supreme Court decision rendered in Ward remains
consistent with this view. Yet, the state recently has taken steps to create
policy considerations that may undermine this lengthy tradition. When the
Missouri Supreme Court abrogated interspousal immunity,"5 8 the state
evinced a strong public policy of compensation for victims of intentional and
negligent torts caused by family members.5 9 Underlying this policy
consideration is an implied assumption that adequate compensation will be
available to restore the injured victim.' 6° When insurance companies limit
contractual liability by inserting household exclusion clauses into insurance
policies, the effect is arguably to deter the household member from bringing
an action against the negligent driver and to exclude adequate compensation
for the injured household victim.' 6' Thus, the existence of household
exclusion clauses in motor vehicle liability insurance policies tends to restore
the consequences of family immunities and frustrates the public policy
underlying abrogation.' 62
The Ward court addressed abrogation of interspousal immunity as it
concerns validity of household exclusion clauses and found that Hussman'63
upheld the clauses despite the Missouri Supreme Court's stance in Townsend'( and SA.V.' 6s The validity the Ward court -gave the Hussman

156.
157.
158.
159.

See supra notes 137-47 and accompanying text.
See cases cited supra note 49.
See supra notes 56-64.
Id.

160. See Townsend v. Townsend, 708 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Mo. 1986).

161.
162.
163.
164.

See Note, supra note 27, at 822.
See Note, supra note 22, at 519.
See supra notes 105-108 for a discussion of this decision.
See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
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Although Judge Covington
holding, however, should be questioned.
concurred in Ward, she noted an important discrepancy in the interplay of the
Cameron and Hussman opinions.'6
Judge Covington stated that it is
unclear from the Hussman opinion whether the facts in Hussman are
indistinguishable from those in the Camerondecision. This discrepancy could
make the Hussman language on family exclusion clauses "mere surplusage."' 67 Thus, the ambiguous nature of the Hussman holding indicates that
in light of judicial abrogation of interspousal immunity, household exclusion
clause validity deserves further judicial or legislative attention.
The Ward holding was consistent with the pre-1987 Missouri public
policy of voluntary insurance coverage. After 1987, however, Missouri
amended the MSRL and changed to a compulsory insurance state.61s When
the state adopted mandatory insurance, the public policy manifested was that
there should be compensation for "all" innocent victims of motor vehicle
accidents." Upholding the validity of household exclusion clauses denies
adequate compensation for injured household members and undermines post1987 public policy. Hence, although Ward was consistent with Missouri
precedent concerning validity of household exclusion clauses, continued
validity of household exclusion clauses may be inconsistent in light of the
interplay between abrogation of interspousal immunity and the legislative
change to mandatory insurance.
The Ward court did not discuss the 1985 Missouri statutes that mandated
uninsured motorist coverage. 70 The public policy underlying these statutes

decision.
165. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of this
decision.
166. See supra. text accompanying notes 150-154 for a discussion of Judge

Covington's analysis.
167. Id.
.168. See supra text accompanying note 71.
169. See supra note 73.
170. Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (1978). This statute required "liability policies
to afford coverage to insureds who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles." Harrison v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins., 607 S.W.2d
137, 140 (Mo. 1980) (en banc). The 1978 Missouri uninsured motorist statute
provides:
No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or
issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered
or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or
supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits for bodily injury or death
set forth in section 303.030, RSMo, for the protection of persons insured
thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/10
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is to provide financial protection for insureds against uninsured motorists."
It has been determined that excess/escape clauses7 2 inserted into motor
vehicle liability insurance policies violate this public policy by reducing
available coverage below the statutory minimum.
Arguably, the same
analysis should apply to household exclusion clauses that reduce or completely
exclude coverage forhousehold members.
The Ward court based its decision on traditional contract principles,
stipulating that parties are free to contract and agree to any provisions that are
considered lawful and reasonable.' 4 The court did not address, however,
the idea that insurance contracts are typically contracts of adhesion. 175 An
insurance contract usually is entered into between an insurer and a customer
on a "take it or leave it" basis. 76 There is relatively little room for equal
bargaining power where the average customer purchases insurance once per
year from an insurance company that is in the business of. entering contracts
on a daily basis. This point is made particularly compelling by Missouri's
requirement of mandatory automobile liability insurance coverage.
An alternative approach would be to look at the clause in light of the
doctrine of "reasonable expectations. 1 77 This doctrine advocates that
insurance policy language should be interpreted as a lay person would

operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death, resulting therefrom ....
Mo. REV. STAT. § 379.203 (1978).
171. See Otto v. Farmers Ins., 558 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Brake
v. MFA Mut. Ins., 525 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
894 (1975).
172. These clauses limit coverage on the policy to "the excess of its limits of
liability over the limits of other insurance available." Note, Uninsured Motorist
Coverage-Validity ofAnti-Stacking Provisions and Workmen's Compensation Set-off
Clause, 39 Mo. L REV.96, 96 (1974).
173. See Steinhaeufel v. Reliance Ins., 495 S.W.2d 463,468 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).

174. American Family Mut. Ins. v. Ward, 789 S.W.2d 791, 795 (Mo. 1990) (en
band).
175. See Keeton, HonoringReasonableExpectations in the Interest of Life and
Health Insurance Contracts, 1971 A.B.A. INS. SEC. 213, 213 (1971).
176. Note, supra note 27, at 826. See also Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.,
236 N.W.2d 870, 885 (N.D. 1975) (adhesion contract analysis was used to void a
family exclusion clause).
177. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights at Variance with PolicyProvisions,83 HARv.
L REV. 961, 967 (1970) (the thrust of the doctrine of reasonable expectations is that
the reasonable expectations of applicants will be honored even when the policy says
otherwise). See also Lightner v. Farmers Ins., 789 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Mo. 1990) (en
banc) (an example of the doctrine of reasonable expectations recognized by Missouri
courts).
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understand and expect it to be interpreted. 178 Thus, the test would be
whether Larry Ward expected his insurance policy to cover injuries of
household members and whether American Family called the exclusion clause
to Larry Ward's attention at the time the policy was signed, 79 not whether
the clause was clear and unambiguous as in the Ward court analysis.
Ward has differing ramifications for the insurance industry and the
individual. The decision benefits insurance companies by allowing them to
limit their contract liability on policies entered into before 1987. By not
deciding the validity of household exclusion clauses in light of Missouri's
mandatory insurance law, however, the decision is limited, and benefits for the
insurance industry are questionable on post-1987 policies. 80 The court also
leaves questionable the status of renewal policies.
The ramifications for Missouri consumers are equally limited. If the
consumer entered into a policy before 1987, the decision arguably has
negative results for household members involved in automobile accidents.
Validating a household exclusion clause leaves injured family members with
little viable recourse for reimbursement for injuries. Although abrogation of
interspousal immunity would allow an injured spouse to bring suit against
another spouse as a negligent driver, availability of compensation without
insurance would result only in a redistribution of family assets.
Consumers who entered into policies after 1987 and those who have
policies renewed after 1987 also have an uncertain status regarding household
exclusion clause validity. By determining that household exclusion clauses
are valid in policies issued before mandatory insurance was legislated, the
supreme court implies that there may be a different result on policies entered
into after 1987.8 This implication is not sufficient, however, to protect
innocent family members who are injured in post-mandated insurance years.
Similarly, a consumer involved in an accident who is found partially
negligent and seeks contribution from a third party who is also to blame,
would not be allowed to do so if tb. injured party is a household member and
passenger in the negligent third party's vehicle. Thus, a consumer's right to
contribution claims may be undermined.
The continued validity of household exclusion clauses in post-1987
insurance policies is in great need of judicial or legislative attention. A viable
solution would be for the legislature to pass a statute that invalidates or
restricts household exclusion clauses in motor vehicle liability insurance
policies entered into after 1987. An example of state legislation restricting use

178. Keeton, supra note 177, at 967.
179. Id. at 968.
180. See Lieberman, Household Exclusions' Valid in Pre-1987Auto Insurance
Policies, 4 Mo. LAw. WEEKLY 537, 540 (May 1990).
181. Id.
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of household exclusion clauses is found in Maine Revised Statutes Annotated." Under this statute, no insurer may sell or renew a policy on or after
January 1, 1986, that excludes insurance coverage for injuries to the insured's
family members unless specific statutory requirements are met.18 Included
in this statute is a requirement of disclosure of the household exclusion to the
insured."8 With legislative attention, Missouri's current public policies
underlying abrogation of interspousal immunity, contribution and apportionment doctrine, and compulsory insurance could be preserved.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of household exclusion clause validity in Missouri is still
undetermined for post-mandated insurance years. By limiting the scope of
Ward, the Missouri Supreme Court remained consistent with pre-mandated
insurance public policy but implied that the clause would not be valid in
policies entered into after 1987. By not taking a clear stance on this issue, the
Ward court allows household exclusion clauses to co-exist with a public
policy that is clearly inconsistent with the purpose underlying the clause. This
important issue is in great need of judicial or legislative attention. Without
a stance on the issue, a large class of innocent victims will continue to be
unable to recover adequately for injuries caused by motor vehicle accidents,

182. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A. § 2902-A (1989).

183. Id. The statutory provision provides, in part:
2. EXCLUSION. No insurer may sell or renew an insurance policy
providing motor vehicle liability insurance on or after January 1, 1986, that
excludes coverage for injuries sustained by the insured's family members
unless the insurer notifies the bureau in writing of its utilization of the
exclusion, the insurer notifies each of its licensed agents within the State of
its utilization of the exclusion and the exclusion is provided by a separate
endorsement to the insured's policy. An exclusion that does not meet the
requirements of this section shall be invalid and of no effect.
Id.

184. Id. The statutory provision further provides:
3. DISCLOSURE OF EXCLUSION PROVISION. Every insurance policy
providing motor vehicle liability insurance shall clearly state on the face of
the policy whether the policy excludes coverage for liability for injuries
sustained by the insured's family members. The requirements of this
subsection may be satisfied by language on the cover sheet of the policy or
which is securely affixed to the front of the policy in a manner not to
obscure other policy provisions. The bureau shall, by rule, specify the
specific clear and concise language to be required to satisfy this requirement.
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and the policy underlying mandatory insurance for all citizens will not be
given adequate effect.
BEVERLY G. BAUGHMAN
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